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State Aid for Kentucky Units of Local Government:
Some Constitutional Problems
By KEN E. VNN iGEna m*
Statements in certain opinions of the Kentucky Court of Ap-
peals have given rise to the general belief that, due to constitu-
tional restrictions, the state of Kentucky cannot extend financial
assistance, except assistance for highways and educational pur-
poses, to its units of local government.1 Yet the state does now in
some small measure aid these units; and, if the constitutional pro-
visions thought to prohibit state aid were considered in their
proper sense, further assistance could be made available.
State aid for units of local government seems a necessity, in-
asmuch as the property tax, possibly the only major tax suitable
for local administration, does not produce sufficient revenue to
enable these units to meet the inflationary costs of rendering
existing services, much less to permit them to undertake the
task of supplying additional ones.2 Moreover, unless state grants
are allocated to units of local government, functions which have
been traditionally performed on the local level must, of neces-
sity, be transferred to the state government. With these facts in
mind, the constitutional provisions supposedly prohibiting state
aid in Kentucky, as well as similar provisions contained in the
constitutions of other states, will be considered. But before any
rational consideration can be given them, it is necessary to ex-
amine the legal relationship existing between the state and its
units of local government, for upon this relationship, it seems,
depends the constitutionality of state aid.
0 A.B., M.A., University of Kentucky; Ph.D., University of Illinois, Assistant
Professor of Political Science, University of Kentucky, Lexington. The author
wishes to express his appreciation to Miss Ruth McQuown, Research Associate,
Bureau of Government Research, University of Kentucky, for her assistance in the
preparation of this article for publication.
'See Mitchell v. Knox County, 165 Ky. 543, 177 S.W. 279 (1915); Fiscal
Court of Scott County v. Davidson, 259 Ky. 498, 82 S.W. 2d 801 (1935); Miller
v. Sturgill, 304 Ky. 823, 202, S.W. 2d 632 (1947).
'Sales taxes cannot be administered effectively by local authorities except
perhaps in very large cities. Four Kentucky cities-Louisville, Paducah, Lexington,
and Newport-have enacted ordinances levying payroll (income) taxes.
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STATE-LOCAL LEGAL RELATIONSHIPS
Local self-government is frequently extolled as one of the
cardinal virtues of American democracy. But apart from self-
government prerogatives exercised under constitutional home-
rule charters, the only constitutional right of local self-govern-
ment enjoyed by local communities is the right of their voters to
elect officers to administer the laws, most of which are state in
character.3 Although the case for local self-government may be
argued upon historical grounds, the great weight of judicial
authority today rejects such an argument entirely.4 As stated in
a dissenting opinion of the Florida Supreme Court:
"The facts are that there is now hardly an element of
what we term local self-government that is not subject to
congressional or state regulation or both. No principle of
law is more subject to change or modification. Any attempt,
therefore, to fasten on it a fixed status or to set it apart as
something that cannot be dealt with even by the power
that created it is 'sound and fury signifying nothing".
During the early period under the present Kentucky Constitu-
tion the Court of Appeals appears to have given some sanction
to the inherent right of local self-government,0 but now thor-
oughly discredits it. Speaking in a 1928 case,7 the court said:
"The theory that the right of local self-government inheres
in the municipalities of this state is essentially unsound, and
is based upon the now discarded doctrine that the Constitu-
tion of this state is a grant or delegation of power by the
people of the state to the state government, and is not, as
is now generally recognized, a limitation upon a power
which, merely by virtue of its sovereignty, would otherwise
be absolute".
'Cf. GOODNOW, THE P,iNcImEs OF THE ADmSTRATIVE LAW OF T=E UN=rED
STATES 176 (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1905).
'See DrLLON, Mumci'M. CORPORnATONS 154 (5th ed. 1911).
'Amos v. Mathews, 99 Fla. 1, 126 So. 308 (1930).
'See particularly City of Lexington v. Thompson, 113 Ky. 540, 24 Ky. Law
Rep. 384, 68 S.W. 477 (1902). The doctrine that local units enjoy certain in-
herent rights of local self-government was also followed for a time by the courts
of California, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, Nebraska, and Texas. It was perhaps
most ably stated by Judge Cooley in the case of People ex rel. Le Roy v. Hurlbut,
24 Mich. 44 (1871).
'Board of Trustees of Policemen's Pension Fund v. Schupp, 223 Ky. 269,
3 S.W. 2d 606 (1928).
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What, then, is the legal relationship existing between the state
and its units of local government? This relationship can perhaps
best be illustrated by defining a city and a county, the two im-
portant units of local government throughout most of the United
States. A city is defined as "a legal constitution formed by char-
ter from sovereign power, erecting a populous community of pre-
scribed area into a body politic and corporate with corporate
name and continuous succession and for the purpose, and with
the authority of subordinate self-government and improvement
and local administration of affairs of state".7a
This definition, it seems, is not altogether satisfactory since it
does not emphasize fully the governmental character of modem
cities. Though it is true that cities perform some corporate or
proprietary functions, such functions are few when compared
with the number of governmental or state functions they perform.
According to the Kentucky Court of Appeals:
"A municipal corporation has a two-fold character, the one
governmental and the other proprietary. In the establish-
ment of a municipality, the state, acting through its Legis-
lature, does not divest itself of its right to administer the
public affairs of the state in its entirety; it merely constitutes
the city its agent for the purpose of government within a
limited territory. As such agency, the city executes the
functions which would otherwise be performed by the state
itself, and in such capacity it is imbued with all the rights
and immunities of sovereignty". 8
According to Chief Justice Taney, "Counties are nothing more
than certain portions of the territory into which the state is
divided for the more convenient exercise of the powers of gov-
ermnent". 9 This definition is followed, at least in principle, by the
courts of all states. For example, the Kentucky Court of Appeals
has said that "a county is a subordinate political subdivision of
the state and part of the sovereignty itself, existing and operating
under the general laws of the commonwealth, and deriving all
its powers of functioning through express legislative enactments,
148 CoRPus Jupas 65.
'City of Hazard v. Duff, 287 Ky. 427, 154 S.W. 2d 28 (1941).
'State of Maryland v. Baltimore and Ohio R.R. Co., 8 How. 534 (1845).
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as contradistinguished from a city with a charter".10 Counties
exist, therefore, primarily as local administrative units for effectu-
ating the will of the state. Although state courts occasionally
assert that counties have a private or proprietary character as well
as a public or governmental character," when actually faced with
the task of determining the nature of specific county functions,
they are loath to recognize the private character. Indeed, some
courts have gone to the extent of stating that counties perform
scarcely any non-governmental functions.12
It is clearly evident, therefore, that because of their legal
nature, both counties and cities are integral parts of the state
government; they are mere agencies through which that govern-
ment carries out its policies; and as such they cannot be con-
sidered apart from the state itself. In other words, they cannot
be isolated from the state and considered as self-governing units
free to execute state laws according to their own wishes; for, if
this were the case, the state would be rendered impotent to carry
on its government. Accordingly, the Kentucky Court of Appeals
has held that, unless the Constitution forbids, the state has an
unquestioned right to utilize these agencies or any other agencies,
public or private, to effect its purposes."
If counties and cities are used to perform state functions, does
it not follow logically that the state may furnish the funds re-
quired for their performance? The answer to this question would
seem evident; but due to general prohibitions contained in most
state constitutions against state aid to local units, and due also to
strong sentiment in favor of local self-government on the part of
some state jurists, some state courts, including the Kentucky
Court of Appeals, have occasionally held that it cannot. For this
reason it seems desirable to examine these constitutional prohibi-
tions, along with their judicial constructions, to ascertain their
proper meaning.
"Edwards v. Logan County, 244 Ky. 296, 50 S.W. 2d 83 (1932).
' See for instance, Fox v. Board for Louisville and Jefferson County Children's
Home, 244 Ky. 1, 50 S.W. 2d 67 (1932).
See Commissioners of Hamilton County v. Mighels, 7 Ohio State Rep. 109(1865); Wheatly v. Mercer, 72 Ky. 9 Bush 704 (1873). See also 14 Am. Jun.
186-187.
City of Louisville v. Commonwealth, 134 Ky. 488, 121 S.W. 411 (1909).
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CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRICTIONS ON STATE AID
Section 176 of the Kentucky Constitution provides that "the
Commonwealth shall not assume the debt of any county, muni-
cipal corporation or political subdivision of the state, unless such
debt shall have been contracted to defend itself in time of war,
to repel invasion or to suppress insurrection"; section 177 pro-
vides that "the credit of the Commonwealth shall not be given,
pledged or loaned to any individual, company, corporation or
association, municipality or political subdivision of the state";
and section 181 provides that "the General Assembly shall not
impose taxes for the purposes of any county, city, town or other
municipal corporation, but may, by general laws, confer on the
proper authorities thereof, respectively, the power to assess and
collect such taxes."
Each of these sections has a separate history and purpose, but
the Court of Appeals has generally construed them to have the
same end, namely, to prohibit state aid for units of local govern-
ment. The court has not been consistent, however, in interpreting
them. In some instances, it has held that one or more of them
prohibit state aid; but in other instances, it has ignored these same
rulings and allowed aid. For example, in a 1915 decision,14 it
stated that section 177 was intended to prohibit all aid for a
county, but by virtue of a 1909 "Good Roads" amendment state
aid for county roads was made possible. In this same decision, it
noted that a 5-cent state property tax from which revenues for
road aid were derived was designated a state-road tax by the leg-
islature and held, consequently, that its levy and appropriation
by the state did not constitute state imposition of taxes for a
county purpose in violation of section 181. To sum up, the court
first stated that aid for a county would have been impossible
without the 1909 amendment, but later it said that the road tax
was not imposed for a county, but rather to accomplish a state
purpose. Since the levy and appropriation of the tax pertained
to a state purpose, it seems that the question of section 177 was
scarcely, if at all, involved.
Undoubtedly, much of the confusion concerning the constitu-
tionality of state appropriations for local units stems from the
' Mitchell v. Knox County Fiscal Court, 165 Ky. 543, 177 S.W. 279 (1915).
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court's not infrequent failure to recognize the distinction between
aid for a local unit acting in its private capacity and aid to enable
that unit to accomplish a state purpose. 15 It is significant, how-
ever, that in 1949 the Court of Appeals, without considering
either section 176 or section 177, did uphold state appropriations
for the building of hospitals by units of local government, holding
that such appropriations accomplished a state purpose and, con-
sequently, did not impose taxes for local purposes. 6 Although
sections 176, 177, and 181 have a somewhat common aim and,
thus, cannot be considered wholly apart from each other, they
will be considered here separately in order that their exact mean-
ing may be made clear.
The Meaning of Section 181
Section 181, as previously noted, stipulates that "the General
Assembly shall not impose taxes for the purposes of any county,
city, town, or other municipal corporation, but may, by general
laws, confer upon the proper authorities thereof, respectively, the
power to assess and collect such taxes". The Debates of the Ken-
tucky Constitutional Convention do not reveal the source of this
provision; but it is almost identical with a provision contained in
the Colorado Constitution of 187617 and was probably copied from
that document. Provisions similar to section 181 are found in the
constitutions of several states;' 8 and according to one writer, 9
their original source was a provision contained in the Tennessee
Constitution of 183420 and, incidentally, included as Art. II, Sec.
29 of the present Tennessee Constitution.
'For further discussion of this distinction see below, "The Meaning of Sec-
tion 177".
' Miller v. State Building Commission, 308 Ky. 249, 214 S.W. 2d 265 (1948).
ART. X, see. 10.
' Concerning these provisions see 46 A.L.R. 612; 106 A.L.R. 908.
McBAIn, TnE LAw AND THE PRAcTiCE OF MuNICIPAL Hoam RuLE, 1916-
1930 48 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1933).
' AnT. II, sec. 29, "The General Assembly shall have the power to authorize
the several counties and incorporated towns in this State to impose taxes for county
and corporate purposes respectively, in such manner as shall be prescribed by
law". This provision, on its face, appeared harmless, and was, in fact, actually
superfluous, for according to the rule of construing state legislative powers, i.e., a
state legislature possesses all powers not forbidden it by the state or federal con-
stitutions, it really did not grant or take away power from the legislature; but in at
least one case, Nicol v. The Mayor of Nashville, 9 Humph. (Tenn.) 252 (1848),
it was held to limit legislative control over local government.
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These provisions were undoubtedly intended to free local gov-
ernments from unwarranted legislative abuses; but the fact that
they would, in some instances, be interpreted to prevent state ap-
propriations for these units probably never occurred to constitu-
tion framers of the Nineteenth Century.2' In this connection, it
seems noteworthy that, though the recent Missouri Constitution
retains the pertinent provision contained in the preceding one, it
adds the following provision: "Nothing in this constitution shall
prevent the enactment of general laws directing the payment of
funds collected for state purposes to counties or other political
subdivisions as state aid for local purposes".22 It would seem that,
in view of their original aim-to guarantee local governments some
measure of home rule-section 181 and comparable provisions of
other state constitutions would not necessarily prohibit state aid
to local units even for local purposes. But the Kentucky Court of
Appeals, as well as the courts of other states, assumes that they
do. State appropriations for such units are usually upheld on the
ground that they are intended to accomplish a state purpose.
It should be noted that in some states the courts take the view
that the constitutional prohibition against state imposition of
taxes for local purposes applies only to property taxes; 23 and, thus,
in these states, state grants to local units may be made from non-
property tax revenues. On the other hand, in other states the
courts hold the prohibition applicable to all types of revenue.24
Although the Kentucky Court of Appeals has never passed directly
upon this question, some of its decisions seem to indicate that it
regards section 181 as being applicable to all revenue sources.25
The Kentucky Court of Appeals has never under section 181
disallowed a state appropriation designed to assist a local agency
to achieve a state purpose. This is likewise the situation in Cali-
fornia, a state whose Constitution contains a provision very similar
'aAt this time, apart from state aid for education and internal improvements,
state aid for units of local governments was scarcely considered.
"Mo. CoNST. OF 1945 AnT. X, sec. 10.
" State v. Camp Sing, 18 Mont. 128, 44 P. 516 (1896); Idaho Gold Dredging
Co. v. Balderston, 58 Ida. 692, 78 P. 2d 105 (1938); Trustees', Executors' and
Securities Ins. Corp. v. Hooton, 53 Okla. 530, 157 P. 293 (1916).
'City of Los Angeles v. Riley, 6 Cal. 2d 621, 59 P. 2d 187 (1936); Walker
v. Bedford, 93 Colo. 400, 26 P. 2d 1051 (1933).
See particularly Mitchell v. Knox County Fiscal Court, 165 Ky. 543, 177
S.W. 279 (1915).
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to section 181.26 The Colorado and Idaho supreme courts, under
similar constitutional provisions, have also upheld state grants to
counties for the purpose of carrying out state functions.27 Further-
more, the California Supreme Court has upheld a state appropria-
tion for counties under a statute which did not specify that the
appropriated moneys should be applied for state purposes.281 In
upholding this grant, the court considered that counties exist
primarily as agents of the state, and consequently held that the
presumption was that such moneys would be spent to effect
state purposes. It pointed out that in case the moneys were mis-
applied the courts stood ready to afford proper remedies. In con-
trast to the California holding, the Montana Supreme Court has
invalidated a statute authorizing a state grant of funds to coun-
ties, because the statute did not specify how such funds should
be used.2 9 There was in this case, however, a strong dissent, urg-
ing that the grant should have been upheld on the grounds ad-
vanced in the California decision.
In a 1915 decision, 3° already noted, the Kentucky Court of
Appeals stated that as originally written section 177 (the section
forbidding the state to lend its credit to its political subdivisions)
prohibited altogether any state aid for local government; but that
as a result of a 1909 "Good Roads" Amendment state aid for road
purposes was rendered possible. In this same decision the court
upheld a state appropriation for road aid, stating that the tax
therefor was to accomplish a state purpose and, thus, its levy and
subsequent appropriation did not constitute an imposition of
taxes for county purposes in violation of section 181. Since this
decision state appropriations designed to assist local agencies to
accomplish state purposes have been upheld by the Court of
Appeals under section 181, sometimes without the question of
section 177 even being raised.
In the 1981 case of Holland v. Fayette County,31 the court held
that in the absence of a statute designating the units of govern-
' Los Angeles County v. Riley, 6 Cal. 2d 625, 59 P. 2d 139 (1936).
In re Hunter's Estate; Hughes v. State, 97 Colo. 279, 49 P. 2d 1009 (1935);
Ada County v. Wright, 60 Ida. 394, 92 P. 2d 134 (1989).
'Los Angeles County v. Riley, 6 Cal. 2d 625, 59 P 2d 139 (1936).
Lindeen v. Montana Liquor Control Board, 122 Mont. 549, 207 P. 2d 977
(1949).
"Mitchell v. Knox County Fiscal Court, 165 Ky. 543, 177 S.W. 279 (1915).240 Ky. 46, 41 S.W. 2d 651 (1931).
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ment entitled to receive the surplus fees of the county jailer such
fees must revert to the county. In this decision, however, there
was a dissenting opinion which urged that unless that portion of
surplus fees derived from performing state services were returned
to the state treasury a state grant of funds was being made to the
county in violation of sections 176, 177, and 181. The majority
seems to have based its holding, however, on the fact that, gen-
erally speaking, the county acts not with a will of its own but as
an agency of the state. The court said, "The county is but an arm
of the state government; it is merely a subdivision of the state
formed for administrative convenience; it is required by the state
to erect and maintain a jail. It has no choice in the matter."
Following this decision, the court held that a legislative ap-
propriation of funds to compensate the sheriff for performing
duties vested in him by the County Highway Patrol Act32 did not
constitute either state assumption of county indebtedness (sec-
tion 176) or state imposition of taxes for county purposes. 3 This
act, enacted upon the basis of the police power, required the
sheriff to patrol the highways for the protection of the traveling
public generally. The court admitted that if the duties performed
by the sheriff were purely local in character his compensation
would be illegal. But it noted that he was performing a state as
well as a county service. It noted also that certain other county
officers, such as circuit and county court clerks, jailers, and
coroners received state compensation for performing state duties.
The court's decision in this case seems to warrant the conclusion
that appropriations of state moneys designed to enable county
officers to perform state duties required by statutes enacted upon
the basis of the police power do not violate section 181, section
176, or, for that matter, any other section of the Constitution.
The most recent and perhaps most significant decision34 in-
terpeting section 181 in its application to state grants-in-aid was
rendered in 1948 when the Court of Appeals upheld an act3 5
authorizing the State Building Commission to grant state moneys
to counties, cities, and other municipal corporations for the pur-
pose of constructing hospitals under terms of the Federal Hospital
" KENTucKY ACrs OF 1936 (Fourth Special Session), chap. 13.
"Milliken v. Harrod, 275 Ky. 597, 122 S.V. 2d 148 (1938).
" Miller v. State Building Commission, 308 Ky. 249, 214 S.W. 2d 265 (1948).
' KrNucxy AcTs oF 1948, chap. 237.
KENTUcKY LAW joURNAL
Survey and Construction Act. The grant was upheld on the
ground that it was intended to enable local units to accomplish a
state purpose, namely, the promotion of health; and though the
question of section 176 or section 177 was not raised in the case,
the court said, "We are of the opinion that neither section 181
nor any other section of the Constitution forbids this allocation
of state funds as the state's contribution to this public purpose
of state-wide interest and concern ... "
Apart from its 1915 decision,36 holding that state funds could
be appropriated for building county roads, this is the only in-
stance in which the Court of Appeals has passed upon the ques-
tion of whether the state legislature could, out of state funds,
make appropriations to enable local units to perform specific
functions. 7 Moreover, in this decision the court appears to have
made clear the extent to which the Constitution permits the mak-
ing of state grants to local units. In answering the question of
whether section 181 constitutes a barrier to state aid, it said:
"We think that must depend upon the nature of the pur-
pose for which the money is appropriated or the fund is
allocated. If such fund is to be used for a purely local pur-
pose affecting only the inhabitants of the particular muni-
cipality, clearly it could not be done. On the other hand if
it is one in which the general public and the State at large
are concerned, it may be done. In the latter case the State
is but appropriating or allocating to a county, city or other
municipal agency funds to assist it in carrying out the pur-
poses which, but for the action of the local unit, the State
itself might have to provide."
This decision, along with the other decisions noted, seems to
establish the fact that section 181 does not bar state appropria-
tions designed to assist local accomplishment of state purposes.
When such appropriations are made, however, certain safeguards
must be followed; otherwise they are likely to meet with unhappy
fate before the courts. In the first place, the legislature should
in unmistakable language make it clear that the function to be
' Mitchell v. Knox County Fiscal Court, 165 Ky. 543, 177 S.W. 279 (1915).
'r The state cooperates with its local units in the establishment and operation
of local health departments. The constitutionality of appropriations for this pur-
pose has never been tested in the courts, but it seems that such appropriations are
legal inasmuch as health is a state function.
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aided is state or at least partly state in character. Though, as will
be subsequently noted, a legislative declaration of purpose is not
conclusive upon the courts, due consideration for a coordinate
branch of the government requires that they give it great re-
spect;38 and they will likely accept it unless it is wholly out of
keeping with actual facts. Secondly, the legislature should estab-
lish some state agency to supervise in one manner or another per-
formance of the aided function. Failure of some state legislatures
to observe these two requirements has on occasion been at least
partly the reason for judicial disallowance of state grants-in-aid.39
State and Local Functions Contrasted-State courts are of al-
most unanimous agreement that state constitutional provisions
forbidding state imposition of taxes for local purposes do not pre-
clude state aid for local performance of state functions, but that
they do forbid absolutely any assistance for performance of purely
local functions.40 A determination of what constitutes a state pur-
pose and what constitutes a local purpose is an extremely difficult
task, since as between the two purposes there is frequently no
clear line of demarcation. As noted by the California Supreme
Court, "There are some functions performed by cities that are
both state and local in nature."4' This statement applies likewise
to all other units of local government. Most judicial definitions
of state and local functions have arisen from cases in which the
courts have attempted to determine whether duties and obliga-
tions, financial or otherwise, imposed upon local governments by
state legislatures have been state or local in character. Since the
decisions rendered in such cases have been influenced by argu-
ments of opposing counsel, some little confusion exists among
the courts of the various states as to what functions are state and
what functions are local in character.4 1
When considering whether a particular function has a state
" Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803); District Board of Tuberculosis
Sanitorium Trustees for Fayette County v. City of Lexington, 227 Ky. 7, 12 S.W.
2d 348 (1928); Whitaker v. Green River Coal Co. 276 Ky. 43, 122 S.W. 2d 1012
(1938).
S ee Lindeen v. Montana Liquor Control Board, 122 Mont. 549, 207 P. 977
(1949); State ex rel. City of Charleston v. Sims, 132 W. Va. 826, 54 S.E. 2d 729
(194 ee 51 Air. Ju.179, 182.
"City of Los Angeles v. Riley, 6 Cal. 2d 621, 59 P 2d 137 (1936).
"See 51 Aw. Jun. 388.
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or local purpose, courts generally concern themselves with de-
termining whether the function's performance accrues to the
benefit of the state at large or to a single locality. Thus, accord-
ing to the Colorado Supreme Court, "The test as to county pur-
poses is: Is it for strictly county uses, for which the county or its
inhabitants alone would benefit, or is it for a purpose in which the
entire state is concerned or will benefit?" 3 In 1950, this criterion,
as requoted in another Colorado decision,44 was quoted with ap-
parent approval by the Kentucky Court of Appeals.4" This cri-
terion, though seemingly sound in theory, is difficult to apply in
practice, inasmuch as state and local functions frequently overlap.
State aid for local governments is generally possible, however, by
virtue of the fact that state courts allow aid for functions in which
there is at least some element of state interest. In this regard, the
Kentucky Court of Appeals has said, ".. . even though the local
community may benefit to a greater extent than the public in
general, yet if the service inures to the benefit of the State at
large to any appreciable extent, its control rests with the Legisla-
ture... ."46 Similarly, in upholding state grants to units of local
government for construction of local public works, the California
Supreme Court stated, "It is well settled ... that where the proj-
ect has a state purpose, it is immaterial that in other respects it is
local in nature."47
In some states, the problem of ascertaining what is a state and
what is a local purpose insofar as it relates to determining the
manner and extent to which state aid may be made available to
units of local government is mitigated considerably by the fact
that the courts hold that, unless the constitution provides other-
wise, power to classify such purposes lies with the legislature. 8
This position is succinctly stated by the Colorado Supreme Court:
"In re Hunter's Estate; Hughes v. State, 97 Colo. 279, 49 P. 2d 1009 (1935).
"Police Protective Association of Colorado v. Warren, 101 Colo. 586, 76 P.
2d 94 (1937).
" Hogge v. Rowan County Fiscal Court, 813 Ky. 387, 231 S.W. 2d 8 (1950).
' Board of Trustees, Newport Public Library v. City of Newport, 300 Ky. 125,
187 S.W. 2d 806 (1945).
'City of Los Angeles v. Post War Public Works Review Board, 26 Cal. 2d
101, 156 P. 2d 746 (1945).
"Walker v. Bedford, 93 Colo. 400, 26 P. 2d 1051 (1933); State ex. rel.
Gibbs v. Gordon, 138 Fla. 312, 189 So. 437 (1939); Jordon v. Duval County, 68
Fla. 48, 66 So. 298 (1914); State v. City of Tallahassee, 142 Fla. 476, 195 So.
402 (1940).
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"The whole people, by their Constitution, say to their
Legislature, You shall not impose taxes for county purposes.
That is definite and final. What are county purposes? The
Constitution does not say and does not forbid the Legisla-
ture to say. Hence the Legislature within all reasonable
limits (of course it cannot, by mere fiat, make black white),
has the power."49
As this statement implies, a legislature cannot act arbitrarily in
classifying functions; and, of course, in the final analysis, ultimate
authority to declare the character of functions lies with the courts,
for if a legislature had such authority, the constitutional limita-
tion upon its powers would have no meaning.50 It should be em-
phasized, however, that, in the absence of constitutional restric-
tions, the legislature has wide latitude in classifying functions
(particularly functions concerning whose character reasonable
men would likely hold different opinions), and that the courts,
out of due deference to the judgment of that body, a coordinate
and equal branch of the government, must accord its classifica-
tions great respect.
Though at one time most functions performed by units of local
government were almost entirely of local concern, most functions
which they now perform partake of a state or governmental char-
acter. Only on rare occasions do state courts hold functions per-
formed by local units to be purely local in character. Though the
Kentucky Court of Appeals has never defined state functions in
detail, one may conclude from its interpretation of section 181
that it regards but few of the functions performed by local units
as being purely local in character. Among the matters or objects
which the Kentucky court has held to be wholly or at least partly
of state-wide interest and concern are education,51 highways, 52
criminal-law enforcement,53 coroners,54 vital statistics,5 5 public li-
braries,"0 hospitals and health,57 county farm bureaus,"8 tubercular
"Walker v. Bedford, 93 Colo. 400, 26 P. 2d 1051 (1933).
', See 46 A.L.R. 671, 672.
B' City of Louisville v. Commonwealth, 134 Ky. 488, 121 S.W. 411 (1909).
" Mitchell v. Knox County, 165 Ky. 548, 177 S.W. 279 (1915).
'Duke v. Boyd County, 225 Ky. 12, 7 S.W. 2d 839 (1928).
" Whittenberg v. City of Louisville, 238 Ky. 117, 36 S.W. 2d 853 (1981).
'Furlong v. Darnaby, 206 Ky. 68, 257 S.W. 707 (1924).
" Board of Trustees, Newport Public Library v. City of Newport, 300 Ky. 125,
187 S.W. 2d 806 (1945).
' Miller v. State Building Commission, 308 Ky. 275, 214 S.W. 2d 265 (1948).
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sanitoriums, 59 municipal police departments, 0 county highway
patrol duties,6' and junior colleges.6 It might here be observed
that ff the state gave its financial support to local performance
of even all of these functions (some of which already receive such
support in part), such assistance, by releasing for other uses lo-
cally-raised moneys now being applied to them, would greatly
benefit local governments.
The court has always taken the position that the legislature
has power to require a local unit from its own financial resources
to perform any function of government.63 Moreover, in only rare
instances (all involving matters which it considered purely local
in character) has the court ever held that the legislature could
not impose duties entailing financial obligations upon local units.64
It seems apparent, therefore, that the court considers govern-
mental functions as state or quasi-state functions; for though all
powers, including purely local or quasi-private powers exercised
by local governments, are derived from state legislative enact-
ments, the court has always held that the legislature cannot force
local financial support of functions in which there is no state
interest or concern. Nor can it force local performance of purely
local functions.65 This being the case, it would seem to follow
logically that the state could lawfully subsidize any function or
duty the performance of which it could impose upon local gov-
ernments. Although the court has never explicitly stated such
doctrine, it appears to have given it strong support when, in a
recent decision,66 it stated in effect that the legislature could aid
local performance of any function which the state itself could
perform.
In summary, the Kentucky Courts of Appeals, as well as the
" Hendrickson v. Taylor County Farm Bureau, 196 Ky. 75, 244 S.W. 82
(1922).
District Board of Tuberculosis Sanitorium Trustees for Fayette County v.
Lexington, 227 Ky. 7, 12 S.W. 2d 348 (1929).
"Board of Trustees of Policemen's Pension Fund v. Schupp, 223 Ky. 269,
3 S.W. 2d 606 (1928).
' Milliken v. Harrod, 275 Ky. 597, 122 S.W. 2d 148 (1938).
" Pollitt v. Lewis, 269 Ky. 680, 108 S.W. 2d 671 (1937).
'See Duke v. Boyd County, 225 Ky. 12, 7 S.W. 2d 839 (1928).
"See MacDonald v. City of Louisville, 113 Ky. 425, 68 S.W. 413 (1902);
Kenton County Water Co. v. City of Covington, 156 Ky. 569, 161 S.W. 988
(1914).
1 Fox v. Board for Louisville and Jefferson County Children's Home, 244 Ky.
1, 50 S.W. 2d 67 (1932).
' Miller v. State Building Commission, 308 Ky. 275, 214 S.W. 2d 265 (1948).
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highest courts of other states, holds that the state government may
offer financial assistance for local performances of state functions,
but that such aid may not be extended for performance of purely
local functions. Although state courts have difficulty in dis-
tinguishing between strictly state and strictly local fumctions, the
functional classification problem does not present an insurmount-
able barrier to extension of state aid to local units, inasmuch as
several state courts hold that such aid may be given even though
the local units receive greater benefits than the state. But in
making state aid available for local performance of a particular
function, a legislature should specify clearly its intention that the
aid shall be used to accomplish a state purpose; and it should vest
in some state agency supervision of the aided function. Unless
such steps are taken, the courts may hold the legislative grant of
aid unconstitutional. Finally, an examination of pertinent de-
cisions of the Kentucky Court of Appeals seems to warrant the
conclusion that state aid allocated under the conditions outlined
is not prevented by section 181 of the Constitution.
The Meaning of Section 177
Section 177 of the Kentucky Constitution states that "the
credit of the Commonwealth shall not be given, pledged, or
loaned to any individual, company, corporation, or association,
municipality or political subdivision of the state." Since 1915,
the Court of Appeals has in one case 6 specifically held and in
two other cases6 8 stated by way of dicta that, with the exception
of expenditures for educational and road purposes, this section
prohibits use of state funds for aid of a county.
It is submitted that these holdings do not represent the proper
interpretation of this section; and that it does not, as they suggest,
prohibit state aid designed to assist local accomplishment of state
purposes. In the first place, the third constitution of Kentucky,
that of 1850, contained a provision69 very similar in import to
section 177; and so far as the present writer has been able to dis-
cover, the authority of the legislature to appropriate funds to
' Miller v. Sturgill, 804 Ky. 823, 202 S.W. 2d 632 (1947).
SMitchell v. Knox County Fiscal Court, 165 Ky. 543, 177 S.W. 279 (1915);
Fiscal Court of Scott County v. Davidson, 259 Ky. 498, 82 S.W. 2d 801 (1935).
" ART. II, sec. 33.
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enable any agency, public or private, to perform state functions
or duties was never questioned. Secondly, the holdings of the
court ignore the primary purpose which the framers of the Con-
stitution intended section 177 to serve, namely, to prohibit state
contributions or donations to railroads and internal improvement
companies. In the third place, they disregard earlier judicial in-
terpretations which hold that the state may, without violating
this section, spend funds to administer its government through
agencies of its own selection. In the fourth place, they are at
variance with other Court of Appeals' decisions which hold,
usually without the question of section 177 being raised, that the
state may provide funds for local accomplishment of state pur-
poses. Finally, with the exception of certain decisions of the West
Virginia Supreme Court, they are at variance with decisions of
supreme courts of other states.
As previously noted, section 177 was placed in the Constitu-
tion for the primary purpose of preventing the state from making
grants or donations to railroads and internal improvement com-
panies; and as reported to the constitutional convention from its
committee on revenue and taxation, it did not contain any refer-
ence to the state's lending its credit to its political subdivisions,
but applied only to corporations and other private businesses. 0
The debates on section 177 seem to indicate that it was made
applicable to units of local government to prevent the state from
participating in the debt retirement of a few counties which were
then heavily indebted as a result of their making subscriptions to
railroads and turnpike corporations.71 Again, it should be noted
that, to the framers of the Constitution, the phrase 'lending of
credit" meant acting as a surety; they did not interpret it to mean
direct state payment of a past local indebtedness.7 2 That the con-
vention's real concern was that of preventing any governmental
aid being given to internal improvement companies is further
evidenced by the fact that it added another section (179), very
similar in purpose to section 177, and made it applicable to coun-
ties and other political subdivisions of the state.
In its early construction of section 177, the Court of Appeals,
"Debates, Kentucky Constitutional Convention of 1890, Vol. II, p. 2373.
'Ibid., pp. 2646-2648.
'Ibid., p. 2644.
STATE Am Fon LocAL GovRimE=
appears to have clearly recognized the meaning which the framers
of the Constitution intended it to have. In 1892, only one year
following the adoption of the Constitution, the court had before
it a case73 involving the question of whether section 177 prevented
the legislature from making an appropriation for the purpose of
enabling the Kentucky Board of Managers to display the state's
resources at the World's Columbian Exposition to be held at
Chicago. Here the court decided that the board selected to
expend the state's money was merely acting as the state's agent;
and held, consequently, that the making of an appropriation
designed to enable it to perform this duty was, in no sense, lending
the credit of the state. Further, the court noted that, throughout
previous years, the legislature had appropriated moneys for like
purposes, and added its opinion that, had the constitutional con-
vention in tended to discountenance such appropriations for the
future, it would have done so in unmistakable terms.
In the 1904 case of Hager v. Kentucky Children's Home So-
ciety,4 the Court of Appeals had presented to it the question of
whether the state could make an annual appropriation to the Ken-
tucky Children's Home. In deciding this case, the court gave
careful consideration to section 177 and held that it did not
prevent the legislature from appropriating moneys to assist a
state-designated agency, public or private, to perform a function
of government. In reaching its decision, the court first stated the
purpose of section 177. "There was a time when the state was
allowed to subscribe, and did subscribe, to the capital stock of
various quasi public improvement companies, and loaned or gave
its credit to such. It was to prevent a repetition of that practice
by the state that the section was enacted. It was to keep the
state out of partnership enterprises, or even the doing on its own
behalf of that class of public works-the building of highways and
public roads." As previously noted, the Debates of the Constitu-
tional Convention support the court's position on this point.
Further, the court noted that section 177 should not be
interpreted so narrowly as to prevent the state from exercising
its governmental powers through agencies of its own choice. "The
"Norman v. Kentucky Board of Managers of World's Columbian Exposition,
93 Ky. 537, 20 S.W. 901 (1892).
"119 Ky. 235, 83 S.W. 605 (1904).
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state cannot now loan or give its credit to any person or corpora-
tion for any purpose-public or otherwise. But this does not mean
at all that the state cannot buy and pay for what it needs to enable
it to discharge its governmental duties. Nor does it mean that
the state cannot employ the services of a person or corporation to
do a lawful act which it has the right to have done, and to pay
for it .... When the legislature is authorized to do a thing gen-
erally, and no particular method is prescribed, it may pursue its
own course in the means adapted to the accomplishment of the
purpose."
In support of this conclusion, the court cited decisions of other
state supreme courts and noted also one of its own earlier de-
cisions75 in which it had held that, when the city of Lexington
boarded its juvenile offenders in the House of Reform, it did not
lend its credit in violation of section 179. In the Lexington case
the court had said, "to hold that a branch of government such as
a county or city, could not exercise a governmental function re-
quired of it by the law by employing the service to be done...
would be to place a narrow and restricted construction upon the
section [179], not warranted by the evils existing at the time of
its adoption, and which were manifestly sought to be cured by
the convention, as well as to materially hamper municipal sub-
divisions of the state in the exercise of necessary powers and
discretion of government." Finally, the court in its opinion in the
Hager case stated, "These authorities clearly settle that the vital
point in all appropriations is whether the purpose is public; and
that, if it is, it does not matter whether the agency through which
it is dispensed is public or not; that the appropriation is not made
for the agency, but for the object which it serves; the test is in the
end, not in the means." (Italics the writer's.)
This statement merits special emphasis whenever the matter
of state aid for local units is being considered, for it points up
the distinction between state aid for local units proper and aid
for local performance of a state function. It is undoubtedly true
that, due to constitutional limitations, many states, including Ken-
tucky, cannot impose taxes for local units, nor can they lend their
credit or make outright grants or donations to them. But state
' Board of Trustees of House of Reform v. City of Lexington, 112 Ky. 171,
65 S.W. 350 (1901).
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financing of local performance of state functions does not fall
within the constitutional limitations, for in such instances, it is the
state, not the local units, which derives the benefit. Moreover,
even though the local units receive greater benefits than the state
itself, the constitutional requirement is satisfied. Finally, it should
be observed that what section 177 really forbids is the state's
making outright grants to local units, grants from which it re-
ceives nothing in return. This view is supported by the Hager
decision and by decisions of almost all other state supreme courts
interpreting constitutional provisions similar to section 177.
Although the Hager decision seems to represent the correct
interpretation of section 177 in its application to state grants-in-
aid, the Court of Appeals has not followed it in any subsequent
decision involving state grants, in some decisions as in the local
hospital case, Miller v. State Building Commission,"0 upholding
grants while ignoring section 177 altogether, and in other de-
cisions invalidating grants which, it seems, should have been
upheld under the principle announced in the Hager decision.
For example, in a recent decision,77 the Court of Appeals in-
validated, under section 177 and section 176 (state assumption
of local indebtedness), an act which provided for state reimburse-
ment of the county sheriff for his expenses incurred in executing
his county-revenue bond, a bond executed to cover his county-
tax collections. Though it may be true that county revenues are
applied for some purely county functions (such functions are
extremely difficult to find), most such revenues are spent for the
performance of state or governmental functions. Indeed, some
state courts take the view that county functions and officers are
so closely tied in with state policy that any state appropriation
made for county governments is constitutional.
7 8
Although the Court of Appeals has ignored its ruling in the
Hager case, it is significant that it has been followed by the Ten-
nessee Supreme Court. When passing upon the constitutionality
of state grants for county hospitals to be constructed under terms
of the Federal Hospital Survey and Construction Act, the Ten-
3 808 Ky. 275, 214 S.W. 2d 265 (1948).
SMiller v. Sturgill, 304 Ky. 823, 202 S.W. 2d 632 (1947).
"See Los Angeles County v. Riley, 6 Cal. 2d 625, 59 P. 2d 139 (1936);
Bexar Co. v. Linden, 110 Tex. 339, 220 S.W. 761 (1920); State v. Lee, 157 Fla.
62, 24 So. 2d 798 (1946).
. KENTUcKY LAW jOURNAL
nessee court compared section 177 with a similar provision con-
tained in the Tennessee Constitution,79 and quoted the Hager
decision with approval.8 0 According to the Tennessee court, the
purpose of the Tennessee constitutional prohibition against lend-
ing or giving the state's credit to or in aid of any person, corpora-
tion, or municipality is to prevent the state from using its credit
as a gratuity or donation, not to prevent use of state aid if re-
quired to accomplish a state or public purpose or to fulfill a state
duty or obligation under the police power.
The supreme courts of Idaho, Texas and California have con-
strued constitutional provisions very similar to section 177 and,
like the Tennessee court, have reached the conclusion that they
do not preclude state grants to local units for the accomplishment
of a state purpose.81 Fairly typical of the position taken by these
courts is a statement made by the Texas Supreme Court in in-
terpreting section 51 of the Texas Constitution, which prohibits
the state from making grants to units of local government:
"It [section 51] does not forbid every appropriation of
state funds for use by counties. It merely forbids the be-
stowing of gratuities on counties. Counties are agents of
the State through which the State performs a part of its
governmental functions. Consequently an apportionment
of State funds to counties to be used by them in carrying
out a part of the duties or governmental functions which
properly rest on the State is not a gratuity within the mean-
ing of the above constitutional provision.... Consequently
public finds may be apportioned by the Legislature to
counties for the purpose of constructing public roads or for
other governmental purposes."82
Among the various state supreme courts, the West Virginia
Supreme Court alone, unless the Kentucky Court of Appeals be
included, takes the position that the constitutional prohibition
" TmomssE_ CONST. op 1870, ART. II, sec. 31.
'Bedford County Hospital v. Browning, 189 Tenn. 227, 225 S.W. 2d 41
(1949).
'Ada County v. Wright, 60 Ida. 394, 92 P. 2d 134 (1939); Jefferson County
v. Board of County and District Road Indebtedness, 143 Tex. 99, 182 S.W. 2d
908 (1944); City of Los Angeles v. Post War Public Works Review Board, 26 Cal.
2d 101, 156 P. 2d 746 (1945).
'Jefferson County v. Board of County and District Road Indebtedness, 143
Tex. 99, 182 S.W. 2d 908 (1944).
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against lending the state's credit prevents the state from financing
performance of state functions; and, at one time, it appears that
the court interpreted the prohibition to apply to all local units.83
The West Virginia court has, however, in a few instances upheld
state aid for state functions performed by counties, although the
Constitution itself makes no distinction in this regard between
counties and cities. It merely provides that "the credit of the
State shall not be granted to, or in aid of any county, city, town-
ship, corporation or person. 84 In a 1934 case85 involving the ques-
tion of whether the state, upon its assumption of responsibility for
education and roads, could reimburse local units for local expendi-
tures made previously for these purposes, the court stated that,
although the Debates of the Constitutional Convention on this
section were confined entirely to the question of state aid for
corporations, unless plain and simple words had lost their mean-
ing, this section forbade all state aid. Following this decision,
however, the court upheld state grants to counties for public
relief purposes 0 and for airport construction, 7 taking the view
that the moneys granted were for state purposes. Further, it has
stated that, without violating this section, the legislature can
always appropriate moneys for public purposes in aid of one of
its own enterprises, such as schools, roads, and modem facilities
for air traffic.8
But in 1949, the court invalidated a legislative act89 appro-
priating moneys for the purpose of reimbursing municipalities for
their expenses incurred in enforcing state law.90 (Such allocations
had been made since 1941.) Here the court said, "We do not
believe that the framers of our state Constitution ever contem-
plated that aid, in any form, would or could be extended by the
State to municipalities out of State funds." The court noted the
absence of any provision for state supervision of local law-enforce-
MSee Note 49 W. Va. L.Q. 99-101 (1942).
See W. VA. CONST. OF 1872, ART. X, sec. 6.
'Berry v. Fox, 114 W. Va. 513, 172 S.W. 896 (1934).
'Kenney v. County Court of Webster County, 124 W. Va. 519, 21 S.E. 2d
385 (1942).
'State ex. rel. Board of Aeronautics v. Sims, 129 W. Va. 694, 41 S.E. 2d
506 (1947).
State ex. rel. City of Charleston v. Sims, 132 W. Va. 826, 54 S.E. 2d 729
(1949).
WEST Vracna. AcTs OF 1947, chap. 13.
" State ex. rel. City of Charleston v. Sims, 129 W. Va. 826, 54 S.E. 2d 729
(1949).
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ment officers, and called attention to the fact that, for several
cities, the sums allotted did not bear any substantial relation to
the extent of law-enforcement problems. It recognized the fact
that the legislature had specified that the funds should be applied
for a state purpose, namely, law enforcement and admitted that
such designation was proper. However, it substituted its wisdom
for that of the legislature, holding that the legislature did not
really intend that the funds should be applied solely for law en-
forcement, but that it intended them to cover or compensate for
municipal revenue losses sustained as a result of the adoption of
the 1982 Tax Limitation Amendment. The court could have-
and it would seem should have-upheld the grant out of deference
to the legislature's judgment.91 In case the appropriated moneys
were illegally applied, the courts stood available to offer proper
remedies. Such position has been taken by the California Su-
preme Court.92
It is interesting to compare the West Virginia court's decision
upholding grants to counties for general public relief with its
decision invalidating grants to municipalities for law enforce-
ment. In enacting the law providing for state aid for general
public relief, the legislature stated, "the support of public as-
sistance is hereby declared to be the responsibility of the State.
The support of general relief is hereby declared to be the responsi-
bility of the county. To the extent that a county is unable be-
cause of constitutional restrictions to meet reasonable costs of
general relief as required by this Article, the responsibility of the
State is hereby recognized."9 3 When it passed upon the constitu-
tionality of state aid under this law, the court said,
"The mere fact that in carrying out this responsibility,
the State, through its legislature, requires contributions
thereto by counties, does not prohibit the state from ex-
ercising its own prerogatives and from using the county
courts as agencies in carrying out its purposes, and the
amount it contributes to the county general relief, by way
of state aid, is not lending the credit of the state to the
county."
'See above, "State and Local Functions Contrasted."
"See Los Angeles County v. Riley, 6 Cal. 2d 625, 59 P. 2d 139 (1936).
"WEsT VmonaA AcTs oF 1936 (First Ex. Sess.) chap. 1.
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But in its decision invalidating state aid for law enforcement
by municipal authorities, the court did not follow the reasoning
announced in the general public relief case, although it appears
that the principles involved in the two cases were the same. Law
enforcement was declared by statute to be a state function; and
such designation was admitted as being correct by the court. But
the court substituted its judgment for that of the legislature,
holding that, even though such aid was designated for a state
purpose, it still could not be given, since the court believed that
the framers of the Constitution did not contemplate that state aid
would ever be extended to cities. As previously noted, however,
the Debates of the Constitutional Convention are silent upon this
matter. The following statement, taken from the majority opinion
of the court, illustrates further the court's untenable position:
"The State can well take care of the enforcement of its own laws,
and can require cooperation and assistance of municipal authori-
ties without being called upon to make a contribution, based on
some idea of reimbursement for services which the municipalities
are under statutory and moral duty to perform in any event."
Here the court has said, in effect, that the legislature can if it
desires extend aid for law enforcement, but in its decision it
actually holds that it can not 4 It is submitted that this decision
is not in harmony with other recent decisions of the West Virginia
court, nor with the decisions of the supreme courts of other
states, and, thus, does not represent the interpretation ordinarily
accorded state constitutional provisions comparable to section 177
of the Kentucky Constitution. In summary, section 177 seems to
prohibit state grants to units of local government for purely local
purposes; its prohibits the state from granting to local units funds
from which it receives nothing in return; but it does not prevent
the state from allocating funds to local units to enable them to
perform state or governmental functions.
' For further comments on the Charleston decision see, James E. Larson,
"Court Outlaws State Aid," 89 Nat. Munic. Rev. 182-185 (April, 1950); Carl M.
Frasure, "Municipal Finance in West Virginia", 23 State Government 107-109
(May, 1950); SHANMEGcEm, COUNTY GOv AND ADmMNsTRATION IN
WEST VmomlA, 75-76 (Morgantown: Bureau for Government Research, West
Virginia University, 1952).
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The Meaning of Section 176
Section 176 of the Kentucky Constitution provides that "the
Commonwealth shall not assume the debt of any county, munici-
pal corporation or political subdivision of the state, unless such
debt shall have been contracted to defend itself in time of war,
to repel invasion or to suppress insurrection." The Debates of the
Constitutional Convention reveal that the particular type of in-
debtedness which the convention had in mind when it adopted
this section was a local indebtedness acquired through contribu-
tions made to railroads and internal improvement companies;"
and though the question was not raised, it is extremely doubtful
whether the convention intended to prevent the legislature from
making grants to local agencies to enable them to perform state
functions. It is logical to assume, moreover, that this section was
intended to apply to an indebtedness incurred in the past, not to
current state appropriations intended to assist local units in effect-
ing state policies.
Section 176 has never been fully construed by the Court of
Appeals; it has been involved in only four cases before the court;
and it has never been considered by itself, but always in con-
nection with section 177 or section 181, or both. It was first men-
tioned in a dissenting opinion in a 1931 case,"" this opinion urging
that the section along with sections 177 and 181 prevented county
governments from receiving that portion of the surplus income
of county officers earned from state fees. In a 1932 decision,97
the court held that section 176, along with section 177, did not
prevent the state highway commission from bearing one-half the
cost of building a city street. Here the court ruled that neither
section 176 nor section 177 had application since the city itself
was not involved, the responsibility for maintaining the street
being that of the abutting property owners. In 1938, the court
had before it a case98 involving, among other things, the question
of whether sections 176 and 181 prevented the state government
Debates, Kentucky Constitutional Convention of 1890, Vol. 1I, pp. 2641-
2644.
' Holland v. Fayette County, 240 Ky. 46, 41 S.W. 2d 651 (1931).
' State Highway Commission of Kentucky v. Board of Councilmen of City of
Frankfort, 245 Ky. 800, 54 S.W. 2d 316 (1932).
' Shannon v. Combs, 273 Ky. 517, 117 S.W. 2d 221 (1938).
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from compensating the sheriff for performing highway patrol
duties, but the comt decided the case on other grounds, leaving
this question unanswered. Finally, in a 1947 case,9 the court did
hold that sections 176 and 177 prevented the state from reim-
bursing the sheriff for his expense incurred in executing his
county-revenue bond, a bond executed to cover his county-tax col-
lections. The court merely mentioned these sections together;
and, consequently, there is no means of ascertaining what em-
phasis it intended to place upon section 176. As mentioned pre-
viously, it seems that the court should have upheld the appropria-
tion, inasmuch as a very large proportion of county revenues is
employed to carry on state functions.
Although section 176 has never been fully construed by the
Court of Appeals, it appears that, when it is considered in its
proper historical sense, it does not prohibit the state government
from making grants to local agencies to enable them to perform
state functions. Indeed, state grants have been upheld by the
court without the question of section 176 even being raised.
Finally, the mere fact that the section has been involved in so few
cases before the court would seem to justify the conclusion that
it is of little importance, at least insofar as it concerns the con-
stitutionality of state aid for units of local government.
SUMMARY
Kentucky is one of the few states which does not offer a sub-
stantial amount of financial assistance to its units of local govern-
ment; and statements contained in certain decisions of the Court
of Appeals have created the general belief that, due to constitu-
tional restrictions, aid cannot be extended except for highway
and educational purposes. Nevertheless, the state's General As-
sembly has in isolated instances passed legislation appropriating
funds for use by local officers and agencies; and such legislation,
when challenged before the courts, usually has been upheld.
Indeed, no state appropriation designed to assist local perform-
ance of a state or governmental function has even been judicially
disallowed.
" Miller v. Sturgill, 304 Ky. 823, 202 S.W. 2d 632 (1947).
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The Kentucky Constitution contains three provisions which
upon superficial examination would seem to prohibit state aid for
local government: (a) section 176, which prohibits state assump-
tion of local indebtedness; (b) section 177, which prohibits the
state's pledging or lending its credit to its political subdivisions;
and (c) section 181 which prohibits state imposition of taxes for
local purposes. Yet, when the purposes which the framers of the
Constitution intended these provisions to serve are considered,
and when the legal relation between the state and its local units
is properly understood, it seems that they do not constitute an
absolute barrier to state aid, but prevent only allowance of aid
for performance of purely local functions, which functions in this
modern and complex age are exceedingly difficult to discover.
When Kentucky's present Constitution was written (1890),
state aid for local performance of governmental functions was
not considered, because, in the first place, the cost of local govern-
ment was not great and property-tax revenues were sufficient to
finance it, and, secondly, since most functions performed on the
local level were considered local in nature-education was an ex-
ception-, it was felt that financial responsibility should rest there
also. But today conditions are greatly altered. Functions which
in 1890 were purely local in character are now clearly state or at
least partly state in character; and property-tax revenues, suf-
ficient to finance local governmental activities in that day, are no
longer adequate. Hence, arises the need for state aid. Such aid-
if local units are to retain their traditional importance-seems
absolutely necessary, because property-tax yields cannot be
greatly increased-though assessments could and should be made
more equitable as between property owners-and because newer
forms of local taxation, such as sales and income taxes, cannot in
most instances be effectively and justly administered on the local
level. Unless local revenues are supplemented by state grants,
at least some of the functions which local governments tradition-
ally perform must be transferred to the state government.
Before considering whether the constitutional provisions re-
ferred to earlier prohibit state aid, it is necessary to examine the
legal relationship existing between the state and its units of local
government. Certain passages from the Debates of the Constitu-
tional Convention seem to indicate that at least some of the mem-
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bers of the constitutional convention regarded local units as being
totally detached from the state government, a conception which
can have no foundation when the legal relation between the state
and these units is considered. Indeed, the Court of Appeals in
some of its early decisions interpretating Kentucky's present Con-
stitution seems to have regarded local units as possessing inherent
powers, and supreme courts of a few other states did likewise.
But this doctrine is now wholly repudiated by all state supreme
courts, these agencies taking the view that, in the absence of con-
stitutional restrictions, the state legislature possesses plenary au-
thority over local units. Counties are considered as portions of ter-
ritory into which the state is divided for the more convenient
exercise of its powers; they have no will of their own and exist
primarily to carry out state policy. State courts not infrequently
assert that counties have both a governmental (state) and a
corporate (local) capacity; but, generally speaking, their corp-
orate functions are few in number as compared with the number
of their governmental functions, some courts even holding that
these units perform scarcely any corporate functions. Although
municipalities are generally regarded as existing to satisfy local
needs, they nevertheless perform many governmental functions,
and, consequently, when they do so, they occupy much the same
legal status as counties.
Since counties and cities alike perform state functions, it
would seem to follow logically that the state governments could
finance the performance of such functions; and, indeed, most
state courts hold that they can. Undoubtedly, some of the con-
fusion concerning the constitutionality of state aid for local units
results from judicial failure to recognize the distinction between
aid for these units proper and aid for state functions which they
perform. When this distinction is made, the constitutionality of
such aid can be easily determined. Associated with this problem
is, of course, the task of defining state and local functions. Most
state courts recognize the fact that it is frequently impossible to
distinguish clearly between state and local functions; but they
hold that in those instances where a function is at least partly
state in character control over it rests with the legislature, the
California Supreme Court holding, for example, that the state may
finance local performance of functions in which there is state
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interest even though local units may derive greater benefits than
the state itself. Finally, unless the constitution forbids, the legis-
lature itself may classify state and local functions; and its classi-
fication, unless wholly out of keeping with actual facts, will gen-
erally be accepted by the courts out of deference to an equal and
coordinate branch of the government. But in the final analysis,
ultimate authority to decide what funptions are state and what
functions are local must rest with the courts, for if the legisla-
ture had final authority, the constitutional limitations upon its
powers would be rendered meaningless.
Although the Debates of the Constitutional Convention do not
reveal the reason for the inclusion of section 181 in the Constitu-
tion, it was undoubtedly placed there to insure local units pro-
tection from state interference in matters purely local. Similar
provisions intended for this purpose appear earlier in the con-
stitutions of other states; and though it can not be determined
with certainty, the Kentucky provision was probably copied from
an almost identical provision contained in the Colorado Constitu-
tion of 1876.
Section 181 has never been construed to prevent state aid
to a local unit. As early as 1915, the Court of Appeals held that
it was not violated when the legislature levied a state-road tax
and earmarked its proceeds for use on county roads. In its
decision, the court noted the fact that the legislature had de-
clared the tax to be state in character, and held further that the
revenues therefrom were devoted to a state not a county purpose.
More recently (1948), the court has upheld, under section 181,
state grants to local units for hospital construction, such hospitals
to be built under terms of the Federal Hospital Survey and Con-
struction Act. The opinion in this case has particular significance
since the court states in effect that the state may finance local
performance of any function which it itself has authority to
undertake. It thus appears that section 181 does not constitute a
barrier to state aid for local governments provided such aid is
used to effect state purposes. But whenever state aid is allocated
for local performance of a particular function, the legislature
should make it clear in unmistakable language that the aided
function is state in character; and it should vest in some state
agency supervisory authority over the function's performance.
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State courts, when passing on the legality of state grants, not in-
frequently look for such provisions; and their inclusion will likely
convince these agencies that the legislature really intends that the
funds are to be applied for a state purpose.
Section 177 provides that "the credit of the Commonwealth
shall not be given, pledged or loaned to any individual, company,
corporation or association, municipality or political subdivision
of the state." Kentucky's third constitution, that of 1850, con-
tained a similar provision; and so far as the writer has been able
to discover that provision was never construed to prevent the
state from making grants to any agency, public or private, for
the purpose of carrying on its government. As the Debates of
the Constitutional Convention clearly reveal, section 177 was
placed in the present Constitution for the primary purpose of
preventing the state from lending its credit to railroads and pri-
vate internal improvement companies. Indeed, another section
(179), very similar in purpose to section 177, was added and
made applicable to units of local government. Anyone familiar
with the history of the period at the time the Constitution was
written knows that this was the evil which the framers of the
Constitution were attempting to correct.
Furthermore, the Court of Appeals in its earliest interpreta-
tions of this section clearly recognized this fact and held that the
convention did not intend by this provision to hamper the state
government in the exercise of its governmental powers. In the
1904 case of Hager v. Kentucky Children's Home00 the court
sustained the validity of legislation providing an annual appro-
priation for the Kentucky Children's Home. Here the court said
in effect that the constitutionality of such an appropriation did
not depend upon the agency selected to expend it, but rather
upon the purpose for which it was intended. In other words, the
constitutional test is in the end, not in the means; and under this
rule, when the state appropriates funds to assist a local officer
in performing a state function, it is not lending its credit in viola-
tion of section 177; it is merely appropriating money to carry on
its own government.
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Although the Court of Appeals, in subsequent decisions in-
terpreting section 177, has not followed the rule announced in
the Hager case, the Tennessee Supreme Court, in a decision in
which it compared section 177 with a similar provision of the
Tennessee Constitution, quoted it with apparent approval. The
Tennessee cont further held that the Tennessee provision did
not prevent use of state aid, if required to accomplish a state or
public purpose or to fulfill a state duty or obligation under the
police power. Furthermore, with the exception of the West Vir-
ginia Supreme Court, supreme courts of other states whose con-
stitutions contain provisions similar to section 177 hold that such
provisions do not prevent state aid for local accomplishment of
state purposes. Although the West Virginia constitutional pro-
vision draws no distinction with regard to the pledging of credit
to counties and municipalities, the West Virginia court permits
aid for county administration of state functions, but denies it to
municipalities when they administer such functions. It is sub-
mitted that there is no logic in the West Virginia rule, and that
it is out of harmony with court decisions in other states.
Despite the ruling in the Hager case, the Kentucky Court of
Appeals has in one case specifically held and in two other cases
stated by way of dicta that, with the exception of aid for highway
and educational purposes, section 177 forbids state appropriations
for aid of a county. In the case disallowing aid, there was raised
the question of whether the state could appropriate funds to
reimburse the sheriff for his expense incurred in executing his
county-revenue bond. Here the court concluded that the county
alone benefited from county revenue collections and, conse-
quently, held that for it to uphold the appropriation would be to
sanction state aid for a purely county purpose in violation of sec-
tion 177 and section 176, the latter section forbidding state as-
sumption of local indebtedness. The court appears not to have
considered the fact that most such revenue is expended to fulfill
performance of state-imposed obligations. When this fact is con-
sidered, it seems that the appropriation should have been upheld.
If the interpretation of section 177 as announced in the Hager
case is correct-and the Debates of the Kentucky Constitutional
Convention, as well as supreme court decisions of other states
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interpreting similar constitutional provisions, seem to indicate
that it is-the section does not prevent allocation of state aid for
local accomplishment of state purposes.
As revealed by the Debates of the Constitutional Convention,
section 176, like section 177, was placed in the Kentucky Constitu-
tion for the primary purpose of preventing the state from paying
local indebtedness acquired through grants made to railroads and
private internal improvement companies. It is extremely doubtful
whether the convention ever intended the section to apply to
current state appropriations made to assist local agencies in the
performance of state functions. Indeed, if the section were so
construed, it would seriously hamper the state in carrying on its
government and, moreover, it would negate the legal concept
inherent in state-local relations. Since the Constitution's adoption
in 1891, section 176 has been involved in only four cases before
the Court of Appeals; and in none of these cases has it been
interpreted by itself but always in connection with section 181
or section 177, or both. In only one of these cases, the case in-
volving the question of whether the state could reimburse the
sheriff for the cost of executing his county-revenue bond, has
the court held that it prevented state aid. Since the court in this
case did not state what influence section 176 had on its decision
(section 177 was also involved), the import of section 176 is not
fully known. Nevertheless, it seems not unreasonable to conclude
that section 176 is not too important from the standpoint of its
being a barrier to state aid; or, otherwise, it would have been
construed in more cases than it has. It seems, therefore, that sec-
tion 176, like section 177, does not prevent state aid for local ac-
complishment of state purposes.
Finally, though the Kentucky Constitution absolutely prohi-
bits the state government from subsidizing performance of purely
local functions, it appears that there is nothing contained in that
document which prevents the granting of state aid to enable local
officers and agencies to perform state functions; and the per-
formance of such functions, it should be recalled, constitutes the
major part of local governmental activity.
